Crimes in Crimea

This article is in the latest edition of Village Magazine.

Crimea, referendum, The Guardian.

Letter published on 18th Mar.  "The fact that the options presented to the Crimean electorate do not include any 'Ukrainian options' (Two options but only one possible outcome, 15 Mar) means that today's referendum is no more or less democratic than our own AV v FPP referendum, in which there were no proportional representation options.  As in Crimea, so too in the UK the powers-that-be have total control over the choice of ballot. Sadly, international rules on the conduct of referendums do not recommend multi-option voting.  Hence those Crimeans who might otherwise have wished to vote for a compromise, or even just the status quo, [were] not allowed a free choice." 

Crimea, referendum.

The BBC does not (yet) talk about multi-option decision-making.  Here's my latest missive: 

Referendums, a brief history: year, state, question, outcome, consequence.  

1988, Yugoslavia, maintain the state, vetoed by Slovenia, impasse.  

1990, Slovenia, secession, 89% yes, war.  

1991, USSR, maintain the state, 78% yes, the opposite - the break-up of the Soviet Union.  

1991, two ballots, one in Croatia and one in the Krajina, secession and no secession, Orthodox and Catholic boycotts but 93% and 90% yes, war.  

1991, Kosovo, independence, Orthodox boycott but 99% yes, not recognised by EU for 8 years, then war.  

1991 (post-war), Nagorno-Karabakh, independence, Azeris in exile but 99% yes, no peace.  

1992, Bosnia, secession, Orthodox boycott but 99% yes, war.  

1992 (post-war), South Ossetia, independence, yes, more war.  

1999 (post-war), Abhazia, independence, Georgians in exile but 97% yes, no peace.   

2006, two more polls in South Ossetia, the Ossetians boycott one and the Georgians the other, another war.  

Oh and by the way: 

1972, Northern Ireland, the border, Catholic boycott but 97% yes, more 'troubles'.

The referendum is a blunt instrument.  In effect, it often disenfranchises those who might otherwise want to vote for compromise - the Yugoslavs, for example.  It is divisive, that or it exacerbates existing divisions.  It is inconclusive: in Russia - in Chechnya Tatarstan etc, - referendums are not allowed, for such ballots could lead to 'the break-up of the Federation.  (They call it matryoshka nationalism' : just as inside every Russian doll, matryoshka, there is another smaller one; so too, in every majority, there is a minority: UK, Ireland, Northern Ireland, West Belfast, Springmartin, my granny.) 

The question in Crimea does not have to be either/or.  A multi-option referendum could allow for compromise.  Newfoundland had a three-option constitutional ballot in 1949; Singapore also had three in 1962; twenty years later, Guam had six.  

Ukraine (letter sent to OSCE etc.)

The Ukraine is only the latest in an increasingly long line of countries - Bosnia, Kenya, etc. - where western advice first suggests a majoritarian form of democracy - a zero-sum form of majority rule, either single party or, if need be, a majority coalition; then, when it all goes horribly wrong, an opposite is recommended - an all-party coalition.  Surely, it would be wiser to start with the latter.

Would it not also be sensible to advocate a more inclusive electoral system?  Indeed, in Ukraine, the zero-sum elections of recent years - Yanukovich v Yushchenko, Yanukovich v Tymoshenko - were part of the problem.  Better, as a minimum, the original US system where not only does the winner become the president, but also the runner-up becomes the vice or deputy.  Better still a preferential system such that, in effect, voters are asked to cross at least one party- if not inter-communal-divide.

Good Governance

The above article has just been published in International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences.  It's on http://www.ilshs.pl/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ILSHS-102-2014-132-155.pdf