About us

I'm on my way to China again.  And here's the blog: https://deborda.substack.com/p/debordaabroad2

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The de Borda Institute

aims to promote the use of inclusive, multi-optional and preferential voting procedures, both in parliaments/congresses and in referendums, on all contentious questions of social choice.

This applies specifically to decision-making, be it for the electorate in regional/national polls, for their elected representatives in councils and parliaments, for members of a local community group, a company board, a co-operative, and so on.  But we also cover elections.

               * * * * *

The Institute is named after Jean-Charles de Borda, and hence the well-known voting procedure, the Borda Count BC; but Jean-Charles actually invented what is now called the Modified Borda Count, MBC - the difference is subtle:

In a vote on n options, the voter may cast m preferences; and, of course, m < n.

In a BC, points are awarded to (1st, 2nd ... last) preferences cast according to the rule (n, n-1 ... 1) {or (n-1, n-2 ... 0)} whereas,

in an MBC, points are awarded to (1st, 2nd ... lastpreferences cast according to the rule (m, m-1 ... 1).

The difference can be huge, especially when the topic is controversial: the BC benefits those who cast only a 1st preference; the MBC encourages the consensual, those who submit not only a 1st preference but also their 2nd (and subsequent) compromise option(s) And if (nearly) every voter states their compromise option(s), an MBC can identify the collective compromise.

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DECISION-MAKER
Inclusive voting app 

https://debordavote.com

THE APP TO BEAT ALL APPS, APPSOLUTELY!

(The latest in a long-line of electronic voting for decision-making; our first was in 1991.)

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FINANCES

The Institute was estabished in 1997 with a cash grant of £3,000 from the Joseph Rowntree Charitabe Trust, and has received the occasional sum from Northern Ireland's Community Relations Council and others.  Today it relies on voluntary donations and the voluntary work of its board, while most running expenses are paid by the director. 

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A BLOG 

"De Borda abroad." From Belfast to Beijing and beyond... and back. Starting in Vienna with the Sept 2017 TEDx talk, I give lectures in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Istanbul, Tbilisi, Yerevan, Tehran, Beijing, Tianjin, Xuzhou, Hong Kong and Taiwan... but not in Pyongyang. Then back via Mongolia (where I had been an election observer in June 2017) and Moscow (where I'd worked in the '80s).

I have my little fold-up Brompton with me - surely the best way of exploring any new city! So I prefer to go by train, boat or bus, and then cycle wherever in each new venue; and all with just one plastic water bottle... or that was the intention!

The story is here.

In Sept 2019, I set off again, to promote the book of the journey.  After the ninth book launch in Taipei University, I went to stay with friends in a little village in Gansu for the Chinese New Year.  The rat.  Then came the virus, lockdown... and I was stuck.

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The Hospital for Incurable Protestants

The Mémoire of a Collapsed Catholic

 This is the story of a pacifist in a conflict zone, in Northern Ireland and the Balkans.  Only in e-format, but only £5.15.  Available from Amazon.

 

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The director alongside the statue of Jean-Charles de Borda, capitaine et savant, in l’École Navale in Brest, 24.9.2010. Photo by Gwenaelle Bichelot. 

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WELCOME

Welcome to the home page of the de Borda Institute, a Northern Ireland-based international organisation (an NGO) which aims to promote the use of inclusive voting procedures on all contentious questions of social choice. For more information use the menu options above or feel free to contact the organisation's headquarters. If you want to check the meaning of any of the terms used, then by all means have a look at this glossary.

As shown in these attachments, there are many voting procedures for use in decision-making and even more electoral systems.  This is because, in decision-making, there is usually only one outcome - a singe decision or a shopping ist, a prioritisation; but with some electoral systems, and definitely in any proportional ones, there can be several winners.  Sometimes, for any one voters' profile - that is, the set of all their preferences - the outcome of any count may well depend on the voting procedure used.  In this very simple example of a few voters voting on just four options, and in these two hypothetical examples on five, (word document) or (Power-point) in which a few cast their preferences on five options, the profiles are analysed according to different methodologies, and the winner could be any one of all the options.  Yet all of these methodologies are called democratic!  Extraordinary!

Main | 2025-06 NÁNKĀI (the speech) »
Friday
Apr252025

2025-07 CHINA Deliberative decision-making

In a role-play in Tiānjīn University, participants (debated and) voted on the optimal size of Tiānjīn's population, and here's the report:  

A MODIFIED BORDA COUNT MBC

on the question: 

“What should be the size of Tiānjīn’s optimal population?”

TIĀNJĪN UNIVERSITY, 2025-04-24

DEFINITIONS

+          MODIFIED BORDA COUNT MBC        A preferential voting procedure for decision-making and

                                                                        elections.  Uniquely, it is egalitarian; it is non-majoritarian;

                                                                        from a choice of usually about 5 options, it can identify the 

                                                                        option with the highest average preference… and an average,

                                                                        of course, includes every voter (not just a majority of them).

+          SINGLE-PEAKED CURVE                    A graph which, when presented on an x-axis of options 

                                                                                  and a y-axis of average preference score, has a single peak.

+          CONSENSUS                                        …is defined as that option which, with an average preference  

                                                                        score above the mean, best represents the collective will;

            it is identified     as the option                 with the highest average preference, (if, that is, everyone                                                                               has cast a full list of six preferences);

                        or                                             with the most points; 

                        or                                             as represented by the peak; in the graph below, it is about 

14.9 millions.

THE SOFTWARE

All participants were first asked to register on 

www.debordavote.com

This can be used:

            +          by the facilitator, to add or subtract options to the ballot, as per the wishes of the participants;

            +          by the participants, to cast their preferences;

            +          by all, to see the results.

BACKGROUND

Tiānjīn currently has a population of about 17 millions.  The question posed was as follows: 

“Tiānjīn should aspire to what size of population?”

A ballot was prepared by the de Borda Institute, and no deletions or additional options were suggested.  The ballot paper therefore consisted of six options, and a full ballot of six preferences gives a total of 21 points.  There were about 30 participants, some working individually, some in groups of two or three, and not all managed to register (for some e-reason).  In total, there were 13 valid votes, and all of them were full ballots of 6 preferences; this led to a grand total of (21 x 13 =) 273 points cast.

                                                                                                              possible                       average

                                                                                                                  score                    preference score

So        a maximum (of six 1st preferences)                       6 x 13   =          78    points        =          1.00

            a minimum (of six 6th preferences)                       1 x 13   =          13    points        =          6.00

            an average (of say three 3rd

+ three 4th preferences) 3.5 x 21               =          45.5 points        =          3.50

THE ANALYSIS

Prior to the vote, all concerned may agree to the following:

If, come the vote, the option with the highest average preference is:

            <          4.00,                 there is no consensus,                 and no decision shall be taken.

            >          4.00                  the outcome is                            the best possible compromise;

            >          4.50                              ”                                  a consensus

            >          5.00                              ”                                  the collective wisdom.

THE FACILITATION

In practice, choosing these scores, and facilitating the choice of options, should all be done by a team of four independent ‘referees’ – a chairperson and three ‘consensors’ as they are called.  Their functions are:

            +          to allow all options which comply with the UN Charter on Human Rights;

            +          to determine and publicise the rules for the analysis;

            +          to facilitate the formation of the ballot, so that (on most occasions) it consists of about 4 – 6 options;

            +          to analyse the results. 

THE OPTIONS

A                     <          12 million

B                      <          15 million

C                      =          17 million          (the status quo)

D                     <          20 million

E                      <          25 million

F                      >          25 million

THE VOTE

In a ballot of, say, five options:

            +          he who casts just one preference gets his favourite just 1 point

                                    (and the other options get nothing0;

            +          she who casts two preferences gets her favourite 2 points

                                    (and her 2nd choice 1 point);

and so on; accordingly,

            +          those who cast all five preferences get their favourite 5 points,

                                    (their 2nd choice 4, their 3rd option 3 points, etc.). 

In effect, then, every voter is thus encouraged to cast many if not all 5 preferences, rtheir favourite as well as their compromise option(s)… and if (nearly) every voter does that, the collective compromise can easily be identified: the option with the highest average preference or the most points. 

THE RESULTS

                                                                                                   actual                          average  

The official results of the vote were as follows:      Option                  score                  preference score

    A                                                                                            48 points                    0.38      

    B                                                                                            57 points                    0.45

    C                                                                                            52 points                    0.41

    D                                                                                            48 points                    0.38

    E                                                                                            37 points                    0.29

    F                                                                                             25 points                    0.20

so, as seen in the following table, these results form a single-peaked curve… implying that the participants have come to a logical outcome.

TABLE            I                       THE RESULTS: A SINGLE-PEAKED CURVE

   AVERAGE

PREFERENCE

    SCORES                   

55

 

.

 

 

 

 

 

50

 

 

.

 

 

 

 

45

.

 

 

.

average

preference

score

40

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

35

 

 

 

 

 

.

 

30

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

25

 

 

 

 

 

 

.

20

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OPTIONS

A

< 12

B

< 15

C

= 17

D

< 20

 

E

< 25

F

>25

 

millions, the population of Tianjin.

 

Taking the outcome to one decimal point, the graph’s ‘single-peaked curve' peaks at < 14.9 millions.

THE OUTCOME

If some of the voters submit only partial ballots, casting 1 or more, but less than 5 preferences, the figures used in the analysis will be affected.  Until consensus voting becomes more widely understood, therefore, a final analysis should perhaps use lower average preference scores.  On this occasion, with an average preference score of 4.5, the outcome of the above MBC ballot is as follows: 

“The participants’ consensus is that the population of Tiānjīn should be no more than 14.9 million.”

 

 

Tiānjīn  2025.04.24

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