About us

I'm on my way to China again.  And here's the blog: https://deborda.substack.com/p/debordaabroad2

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The de Borda Institute

aims to promote the use of inclusive, multi-optional and preferential voting procedures, both in parliaments/congresses and in referendums, on all contentious questions of social choice.

This applies specifically to decision-making, be it for the electorate in regional/national polls, for their elected representatives in councils and parliaments, for members of a local community group, a company board, a co-operative, and so on.  But we also cover elections.

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The Institute is named after Jean-Charles de Borda, and hence the well-known voting procedure, the Borda Count BC; but Jean-Charles actually invented what is now called the Modified Borda Count, MBC - the difference is subtle:

In a vote on n options, the voter may cast m preferences; and, of course, m < n.

In a BC, points are awarded to (1st, 2nd ... last) preferences cast according to the rule (n, n-1 ... 1) {or (n-1, n-2 ... 0)} whereas,

in an MBC, points are awarded to (1st, 2nd ... lastpreferences cast according to the rule (m, m-1 ... 1).

The difference can be huge, especially when the topic is controversial: the BC benefits those who cast only a 1st preference; the MBC encourages the consensual, those who submit not only a 1st preference but also their 2nd (and subsequent) compromise option(s) And if (nearly) every voter states their compromise option(s), an MBC can identify the collective compromise.

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DECISION-MAKER
Inclusive voting app 

https://debordavote.com

THE APP TO BEAT ALL APPS, APPSOLUTELY!

(The latest in a long-line of electronic voting for decision-making; our first was in 1991.)

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FINANCES

The Institute was estabished in 1997 with a cash grant of £3,000 from the Joseph Rowntree Charitabe Trust, and has received the occasional sum from Northern Ireland's Community Relations Council and others.  Today it relies on voluntary donations and the voluntary work of its board, while most running expenses are paid by the director. 

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A BLOG 

"De Borda abroad." From Belfast to Beijing and beyond... and back. Starting in Vienna with the Sept 2017 TEDx talk, I give lectures in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Istanbul, Tbilisi, Yerevan, Tehran, Beijing, Tianjin, Xuzhou, Hong Kong and Taiwan... but not in Pyongyang. Then back via Mongolia (where I had been an election observer in June 2017) and Moscow (where I'd worked in the '80s).

I have my little fold-up Brompton with me - surely the best way of exploring any new city! So I prefer to go by train, boat or bus, and then cycle wherever in each new venue; and all with just one plastic water bottle... or that was the intention!

The story is here.

In Sept 2019, I set off again, to promote the book of the journey.  After the ninth book launch in Taipei University, I went to stay with friends in a little village in Gansu for the Chinese New Year.  The rat.  Then came the virus, lockdown... and I was stuck.

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The Hospital for Incurable Protestants

The Mémoire of a Collapsed Catholic

 This is the story of a pacifist in a conflict zone, in Northern Ireland and the Balkans.  Only in e-format, but only £5.15.  Available from Amazon.

 

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The director alongside the statue of Jean-Charles de Borda, capitaine et savant, in l’École Navale in Brest, 24.9.2010. Photo by Gwenaelle Bichelot. 

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WELCOME

Welcome to the home page of the de Borda Institute, a Northern Ireland-based international organisation (an NGO) which aims to promote the use of inclusive voting procedures on all contentious questions of social choice. For more information use the menu options above or feel free to contact the organisation's headquarters. If you want to check the meaning of any of the terms used, then by all means have a look at this glossary.

As shown in these attachments, there are many voting procedures for use in decision-making and even more electoral systems.  This is because, in decision-making, there is usually only one outcome - a singe decision or a shopping ist, a prioritisation; but with some electoral systems, and definitely in any proportional ones, there can be several winners.  Sometimes, for any one voters' profile - that is, the set of all their preferences - the outcome of any count may well depend on the voting procedure used.  In this very simple example of a few voters voting on just four options, and in these two hypothetical examples on five, (word document) or (Power-point) in which a few cast their preferences on five options, the profiles are analysed according to different methodologies, and the winner could be any one of all the options.  Yet all of these methodologies are called democratic!  Extraordinary!

« 2025-07 CHINA Deliberative decision-making | Main | 2025-05 TIĀNJĪN, NÁNKĀI UNIVERSITY »
Tuesday
Apr222025

2025-06 NÁNKĀI (the speech)

BINARY VOTING: MAYBE WE ALL GOT IT WRONG

“Yin and Yang, a cosmic duality of opposing but complimentary… forces… lie at the centre of Chinese mystical thought.”

2          I arrived in Yúnnán in January, and from Shangri-La (Xiānggélǐlā) 香格里拉 headed eastwards, visiting many local councils on the way.  Your electoral systems vary enormously: some villages (nóngcūn农村) use binary voting, others opt for plurality voting, and a few prefer approval voting; all have elections, but some elect the entire committee, a few exceptions use exams or let the cūnzhǎng村长 choose the other members.  

3          On decision-making, however, everyone uses the binary system.  But so does every democracy: I quote from a debate in Guǎngxī, “少数服从多数” shǎoshù fúcóng duōshù, “the minority obeys the majority.”

So the basic premise of decision-making, be it in the United Nations, in nation-states of all varieties – democratic, theocratic and autocratic – in business and elsewhere, is one and the same: majority rule.  Exceptions are few.  One of the latter involves the United Nations’ COP gatherings – Conferences of the Parties; last year’s COP29 was in Baku (and so was I); they accept that you cannot get the consensus of 200 nations by using majority votes, but they still haven’t considered any better methodologies.  So it is that early every nation uses binary ballots.

4          This is true even in Asia where, as you may know, majority voting was used over 2,000 years ago, albeit only in the Imperial Court.  It is one of the world’s few inventions which was not Chinese, for majority voting started in Greece, 2,500 years ago, where it worked quite well; there were no political parties in those days.  

            One of the first to realise that this binary voting nevertheless has its limitations was a Roman, Pliny the Younger in the year 105, and hence his plurality voting.  But Europe was entering the Dark Ages, and the first country to use a plurality vote in governance – (as far as I know) 

5          – was China: 金朝, Jīncháo, in 1197.  Sadly, it was used only once, for very shortly afterwards, came Chinggis Khan.  Nevertheless, it was a vote of 84 members of the government, and they voted on three options: war against Mongolia, an alternating policy of war and then no war, and thirdly, a policy of peace.  The vote was 5:33:46.

6          The world, however, remained and remains binary.  “Western civilisation is built on a philosophical-theological tradition of binary antagonisms,” Jiàng Shìgōng 强世功 of 中央民族大学  Zhōngyāngmínzúdàxué (Chinese University for Nationalities).  But many political leaders were binary, not least Máo Zédōng, for example, in his anti-rightist campaign of 1957-9, 反右运动 FǎnyòuYùndòng.  

Others, however, have long since tried to move beyond the binary bind: “…the nonduality of right and wrong [is] the state of a buddha,”[1] (and this is also seen in Hinduism).  

            Alas, in the world at large, majoritarianism was and still is dominant… and some majority votes are crazy: “Are you Protestant or Catholic?” was a cause of violence in Northern Ireland… but both are Christian; they are not opposites. “Are you Sunni or Shi’a?” led to wars in Syria and Yemen – yet both are Islamic.

7          Likewise, it would be crazy to choose either ‘yin’ or ‘yang’ by a majority vote.  I would also suggest that there are some pretty strong similarities between communism and capitalism, another nonduality: for one, they are both very European in origin; secondly, as we’ve just been implying, they both use majority voting; and thirdly, they are both creeds based on greed, the exploitation of nature for the gratification of today’s generations. 

* * * * *

           So what I’m going to do today is to talk about majority voting.  It is primitive, exclusive, often divisive, always adversarial and, at worst, in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Rwanda, Ukraine and throughout the Middle East, to name just a few instances, it is a cause of war.  Yet it is seldom questioned, anywhere.  

Indeed, in the villages of China, the councils of Europe, the parliaments and congresses of the world, if a vote has been taken, many people just sort of assume that therefore the outcome of that vote is fair… and even accurate!

I am therefore going to start with a simple example, to show how different methods of voting – all of which are used and regarded as fair – can produce quite different answers.  

MAJORITARIANISM

8          Consider, if you will, 15 political scientists going for a meal.  As you know, in China, every type of food is on the table; the only question which might arise is this, “What shall we have to drink?”  And maybe there’s a choice of four options: pútaojiǔ, báijiǔ, píjiǔ and shuǐ.  So what happens if opinions are divided, if there’s no majority for anything?  If 6 want pútaojiǔ, 4 choose báijiǔ, 3 prefer píjiǔ and 2 opt for shuǐ.  So they consider their preferences.

                        Table              I                      A VOTERS’ PROFILE 

PREFERENCES

NUMBER OF VOTERS

6

4

3

2

1st

pútaojiǔ

báijiǔ

píjiǔ

shuǐ

2nd

shuǐ

shuǐ

shuǐ

píjiǔ

3rd

píjiǔ

píjiǔ

báijiǔ

báijiǔ

4th

báijiǔ

pútaojiǔ

pútaojiǔ

pútaojiǔ

9          And now let us analyse this profile, for several methodologies are available.  

10        Plurality Voting is like the US, the UK’s and India’s electoral system.  You count only the 1st preferences, in which case, the outcome is pútaojiǔ 6, báijiǔ 4, píjiǔ 3 and shuǐ 2, so the winner is 

pútaojiǔ on a score of 6, which is not a majority, only the largest minority.

11        France uses a two-round system in elections: if nothing has a majority, they hold a second round between the two leading options – in this instance, pútaojiǔ and báijiǔ on 6 and 4; and if everyone’s preferences stay the same, the winner is now báijiǔ on a score of 9… which is a majority. 

12        Ireland prefers a knock-out system, the alternative vote AV or single transferable vote STV, which America calls ranked choice voting RCV.  Again, if nothing has a majority, the least popular, shuǐ, is eliminated and its 2 votes go to its 2nd preference, which is píjiǔ.  The scores are now pútaojiǔ 6, báijiǔ 4, píjiǔ 5.  Still nothing with a majority, so the next smallest is out as well, báijiǔ, and its 4 votes go (not to shuǐ, which has been eliminated, but) to píjiǔ which therefore wins on a score of 9… and this is also a majority.   

13        There is also a points system, the Modified Borda Count MBC; of the systems analysed here, it is the only voting procedure which takes all the preferences cast by all the voters into account, always.  With 4 points for a 1stpreference, 3 for a 2nd, etc., the scores are:

pútaojiǔ           24        +          0          +          0          +          9          =          33

báijiǔ               16        +          0          +          10        +          6          =          32

píjiǔ                 12        +          6          +          20        +          0          =          38  

and      shuǐ                 8          +          39        +          0          +          0          =          47 

so the winner is shuǐ on 47.

                        Table              II                     THE DEMOCRATIC WILL 

METHODOLOGY

RESULTS

winner

runner-up

loser

Plurality voting 

pútaojiǔ 6

báijiǔ 4

píjiǔ 3

shuǐ 2

Two-round

báijiǔ 9

pútaojiǔ 6

-

-

Alternative/Single Transferable vote 

píjiǔ 9

pútaojiǔ 6

-

-

Modified Borda  Count MBC

shuǐ 47

píjiǔ 38

pútaojiǔ 33

báijiǔ 32

14        In other words, the totally democratic and fair answer is either pútaojiǔ or báijiǔ or píjiǔ or shuǐ.  It could be anything!  For this particular voters’ profile, it all depends on the voting system used.  

15        As Jozef Stalin used to say, “It’s not the people who vote that count; it’s the people who count the votes.”

DECISION-MAKING

16        It’s time for a bit of theory.  There are two types of majority voting: singletons and pairings.  -     With a singleton – “Option X, yes-or-no?” – there is only one option (or candidate); this is the electoral system used in North Korea, and the decision-making system of pretty well everywhere.  

-           While a pairing offers two options (or candidates) – “Option X or option Y?”  

With singletons, you might find there is a majority against everything; in contrast, a pairing always produces a definite answer… though in a multi-option debate, whether this is actually the democratic will of the voters remains unknown. 

17        So now let’s take a different and simpler example of just 13 professors, and we’ll forget the two whose 1stpreference was shuǐ.  In democratic practice, the ancient Greeks decided, if there are three options on the table – a motion, an amendment and the status quo – we first debate the amendment and then, in a binary vote, we adopt or reject it.  Next, we debate and have a second binary vote on (either the original motion or as amended), the so-called substantive versus the status quo; and hence the decision.  

the motion

v                                  =          the substantive

the amendment                       v                                  =          the decision

                                                the status quo

Let’s now see what happens:

18                    Table              III                   ANOTHER PROFILE  

PREFERENCES

NUMBER OF PROFESSORS

6

4

3

1st

pútaojiǔ

báijiǔ

píjiǔ

2nd

báijiǔ

píjiǔ

pútaojiǔ

3rd

píjiǔ

pútaojiǔ

báijiǔ

So       

pútaojiǔ           is more popular than                  báijiǔ               by        9:4

báijiǔ                                                               píjiǔ                           10:3

píjiǔ                                                                 pútaojiǔ                       7:6       

and

pútaojiǔ           >          báijiǔ               >          píjiǔ     >          pútaojiǔ           >         and it goes round and round in circles ……… for ever!

19        Now the order of voting could be:

            pútaojiǔ 

                v                                  =          píjiǔ

            píjiǔ                                                v                                  =          báijiǔ   

                                                                báijiǔ   

in which case, the winner is báijiǔ.  But if we have:

 

            píjiǔ 

               v                                    =          báijiǔ

            báijiǔ                                                v                                  =          pútaojiǔ

                                                                pútaojiǔ

the democratic decision is pútaojiǔ.  Or if we have

            báijiǔ   

               v                                  =          pútaojiǔ           

            pútaojiǔ                                            v                                  =          píjiǔ

                                                               píjiǔ

the collective consensus is píjiǔ.

In other words, we get different answers.  Accodingly, in majority voting, if and when there is not a majority in favour of any one option, the chair who decides the order of voting has total control of the debate… and of the outcome.  And in those situations where there is a majority in favour of something which the chair doesn’t like, he or she can introduce another option to split that majority, and then again have total control.  In a nutshell, majority voting is manipulable; some politicians are manipulative; and many majority decisions – like the UK’s 2016 vote on Brexit – have been manipulated.

A NON-MAJORITARIAN METHODOLOGY

20        Imagine now a better form of decision-making.  In a land of over 50 minorities, or in a parliament of more than one party, or in a party of more than one person, or the COP30 gathering next year in Brazil, or in a multi-party parliament, there will always be different opinions and nuances.  

Consider a congress, a parliament, an assembly or a UN gathering of 200 countries/representatives/members/delegates/persons.  Initially, then, there may be up to 200 proposals ‘on the table’, but the small guys will join together, and the number of options will soon be less.  If need be, a multi-option ballot in which everyone casts their top six preferences could identify the top twenty options.  Then let the debate begin.

            Motions can be amended, options can be combined, a few might even be eliminated, but only if the original proposer agrees to such a change.  Let us assume there are now ten options still in contention.  A poll could further reduce this number and eventually there comes the final vote, another preferential ballot.  

21        In a five-option debate, it works like this:

+          he who casts only one preference gets his favourite just 1 point

(and the other options get nothing);

+          she who casts two preferences gets her favourite 2 points 

(and her 2nd choice gets 1 point);

+          those who cast all five preferences get their favourite 5 points

                                        (their 2nd choice gets 4 points, their 3rd gets 3, etc.).

The difference is always 1 point.  So the system encourages (but does not force) those voting to cast all their preferences, to support their favourite but also to state their compromise option(s).  

If (nearly) every voter does that, we can identify the collective compromise, the option with the most points or the highest average preference.  And an average, of course, includes every voter, not just a majority of them.  

Politics is the art of compromise.  The above – the Modified Borda Count MBC – is its science.  Unlike the exclusive majority vote, the MBC is inclusive, literally.  It is egalitarian.  

CONCLUSION

22        Despite the words of George Washington, the only major organisation to reject majority voting, so far, as mentioned above, is the United Nations’ COPs.  Sadly, they don’t (yet) use preference voting.  They reject majority voting, but they then discuss… at length… and veto each other, and drink yet more coffee, and fail to reach compromise decisions.  Let us hope, for the sake of peace in the world’s conflict zones, Ukraine, Sudan and the Middle East, and most importantly, for the sake of our collective survival, that humankind reforms our ancient habit of binary thinking, and at long last adopts a methodology which is accurate, egalitarian and peaceful, i.e., non-majoritarian: the Modified Borda Count MBC.

20        Thank you, go raith mile maith agaibh, 谢谢。

 

 


[1]                Longchenpa, a Buddhist monk of the Nyingma tradition.  (P. Christiaan Klieger. Tibet – A History Between Dream and Nation State.) 

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