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The Belfast Agreement:
A Critique

(An edited version of this article was published in Fortnight, in June 1998. It was written, therefore, after the signing of the Belfast Agreement but before the 1998 NI Assembly elections, and long before the Assembly met to do business. The article which follows has been amended a little, both in the text and the diagrams.)

PR-STV in 6-seater constituencies means that any party with 14% first preference support in any one constituency is guaranteed a seat, while any party with the same level of support spread throughout the province is in trouble. Why the Talks should choose a system which hampers all the small parties except the UKUP is at least odd, but thus the larger parties have designed a system which favours their own best interests, at the expense of pluralism or any other 'unnecessary' ideals.

What's done is done; now let us look at the drama as it will doubtless unfold, a play of three Acts and many Scenes.

Act I Scene I. The Assembly meets. The First and Deputy First Ministers are appointed under the rules of a 'key' decision, and this again suits the two biggest parties. The appointment of the other ministers follows, and this is done by the d'Hondt system which, as it so happens - pure chance of course - is also biased towards the big parties. So they get two bites of the cherry; but there again, it's their cherry.

The stage is now set. Act I Scene II. 'Key' decision-making. There are two formulas in what is called this consociational arrangement: parallel consent and weighted majorities. Parallel consent requires a majority of the Unionists plus a majority of the Nationalists plus an overall majority. While a weighted majority requires 40% of the Unionists plus 40% of the Nationalist plus 60% overall. Now the MLAs must designate themselves either 'Unionist' or 'Nationalist' or again 'Other', but they can change their minds as well. So let's see what might happen in an imaginary Assembly of 30 UUP, 28 SDLP, 22 DUP, 20 Sinn Féin and 8 Alliance.

Interval.

Act II Scene I. The 30 + 22 UUP plus DUP designate themselves Unionists, the 8 Alliance are 'Other', and the 28 + 20 call themselves 'Nationalists'. But that means the 8 Alliance have no veto powers at all, which is a bit unfair, while both the DUP and Sinn Féin have over 40% of their respective blocks. Ummm, the plot thickens.

Act II Scene II. So the Alliance 8 join the 'Unionists', for now they can do battle against Paisley and Co. And 8 + 30 gives the Alliance/UUP team a combined percentage of the 'Unionist' block of 63%, while the DUP gets only 37%. Which means the DUP can go to blazes.

Act II Scene II

Act II Scene III. If ever Sinn Féin gets a bit uppity, the 8 can become 'Nationalists' instead and join forces with the SDLP, so to render the Republicans into impotence.

Act II Scene III

Unionist
Nationalist

DUP
UUP
TOTAL
AL'ANCE
SDLP
SF
TOTAL
No of MLAs
22
30
52
8
28
20
56
% of Block
42%
58%
100%
14%
50%
36%
100%

But now comes the denouement, Act II Scene IV. Both the SDLP and Alliance become 'Unionists'. They would thus gain a 28 + 8 share of the Unionist block to give them 41%, so the Unionists could thus support a semi-Nationalist agenda, which obviously the Nationalist block, consisting entirely of Sinn Féin, would also support.

Act II Scene IV

Unionist
Nationalist

DUP
UUP
AL'ANCE
SDLP
TOTAL
SF
TOTAL
No of MLAs
22
30
8
28
88
20
20
% of Block
25%
34%
9%
32%
100%
100%
100%

There again, Act II Scene V, if the DUP declares itself to be, well (British) 'Nationalists'... Curtain!

Interval. Popcorn.

Act III Scene I. Having sorted out their 'ethnically clean' labels, they move to the debate, and then the vote. The scenario is a lovely summer's day and a perfect cross-community setting, with no party whips, and each member voting according to that rare parliamentary phenomenon, a conscience. The decision, however, is 'key'. Now let 's say of the 52 'U', 48 'N' and 8 'O', a majority of 27 + 25 + 5 ( = 57) vote in favour of the motion, while 25 + 23 + 3 ( = 51) vote against. So, majorities of 50% Unionists and 50% Nationalists are in favour, though 40% Unionists and 40% Nationalists are against. So, by the parallel consent ruling, the motion passes. But by weighted majority, it doesn't, and very nearly fails. There follows, of course, a bloody great row, as those in favour argue for parallel consent and those against for a weighted majority, with no rules at all on how to resolve the matter!

Worse is yet to come.

Act III Scene II. Harmony has gone, it has started to rain, and the next vote is on a divisive issue. Well, is it to be a 'key' decision? some will ask. In other words, is it to be decided not by a simple majority vote but by a consociational vote, parallel consent and/or weighted majority? The question, then, is how to decide how to decide? Do you take a simple majority vote on whether or not it is a 'key' decision, or is the question of whether it is a 'key' question itself a 'key' question?

Act III Scene III. Some win, some lose. But any group of thirty members may bring a petition of concern. So thirty losers get together and lodge a complaint. So another shirty bunch bring an opposite petition. So the third thirty do a third, asking them both to shut up! Oh dear, what chaos, what confusion, as various disputes centre on the voting procedure and not on the issue at all. Or could this be the very intent of the Assembly designers: mayhem over procedural points, so that everyone will forget whatever it was that divided them. And they all live happily ever after.

The end.

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