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Peter Emerson,
The de Borda Institute,
36 Ballysillan Road,
Belfast BT14 7QQ,
Northern Ireland
Tel: +44 (0)28 9071 1795
Fax: +44 (0)28 9071 1795

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A Review of the Belfast Agreement from the New Ireland Group

In 1998, when the Belfast Agreement was signed, it was agreed that the document itself and its implementation would be subject to a four-year review. Since then, of course, there have been several disruptions to the Peace Process, which has only served to make the review even more important. The following is offered as a contribution to what will surely be a wide debate.

NB A list of abbreviations is at the end of the text.

There are several parts of the Belfast Agreement which are not as democratic as they should be. For example, it uses phrases like "consent of the majority" instead of "consent of the people" and then advocates the majority vote which is a measure not of consent but of dissent: so many 'for' and so many others 'against'.

Little wonder, then, that the Agreement actually proposes four different forms of decision-making, three of which {under a) and b)}involve a voting procedure.

a) Simple majority voting is used in the Assembly when voting on non-key topics, and is to be used in any future referendum on what is, for many, the most key subject of all, the question of sovereignty.

b) Two different types of weighted or consociational voting are used in the Assembly when voting on key issues, (and two different formulas means that the MLAs might one day find a certain proposal is approved under one formula but rejected under the other! Not a good way to gain consensus.)

c) Consensus decision-making - (this phrase implying a verbal rather than a votal consensus) - is used in the North-South body. At the same time, the Agreement also caters for two electoral, or semi-electoral, systems.

i) The electoral system to be used by the electorate when electing the Assembly, PR-STV, which is a fairly good system.

ii) A methodology by which the Assembly can appoint the executive, the d'Hondt process, which is not very inclusive and not a little precarious.

Accordingly, we will now examine these various aspects of the Belfast Agreement, under the following headings:

• Decision-Making In The Assembly
• Beyond d'hondt: electing an inclusive power-sharing executive. And
• Self-determination and the seven-year-itch: the united-kingdom-versus-united-Ireland "never-end-um"
• A Tale Of Three Peace Processes
• Abbreviations

Decision-Making In The Assembly

Consociationalism

Under the old Stormont regime, it was straight majority rule. And that was no good. So they have now devised a different form of decision-making. Alas, it is still majoritarian. Instead of the unionists always out-voting the nationalists, the hope now is that the 'nice' people, the UUP and SDLP etc., will out-vote the "not so nice". It is not, therefore, an inclusive, consensual democratic system, for it is still adversarial.

The disadvantages of this consociationalism, as it is called, are at least two-fold. Firstly, it invariably means that there are only two items on the agenda, that every debate is treated as a dichotomy, and that therefore the vote is of the "A, yes-or-no?" or "A-or-B?" variety. But surely, to suggest, in a divided society like ours, that most political questions should be based on the choice of only two alternatives, is at least unwise.

Secondly, in order to know whether or not the outcome of the vote is in fact sup-ported both by a majority of the unionists and by a majority of the nationalists, it is necessary to know, beforehand, who is what. Therefore, all the MLAs have to designate themselves as being either 'unionist' or 'nationalist', and because some of them object to that basic sectarianism (and quite right too!) they have devised a third category, 'other'.

This consociationalism part of the Agreement thus perpetuates the very sectarianism the accord was designed to overcome. As we shall see, so do some other parts!

International Experience

Consociationalism was 'invented' by one Jozef Djugashvili, known affectionately as Stalin, in 1946. He had just taken over Czechoslovakia, and he knew the Czechs and the Slovaks were not always the best of comrades. So he said, OK, if both a majority of the Czechs say 'da' and a majority of the Slovaks say 'da', then 'da' it shall be.1

Unfortunately, Czechoslovakia inherited this system when she gained her independence after the velvet revolution, and the Slovaks under Mecier then said 'nyet'. So that was that. But at least no-one was killed.

Historical Background

It is an amazing fact of political life, but many decision-making processes and electoral systems have been invented, oh, in some cases several times. People share technical inventions and they sell like hot cakes. But one lot of politicians will not necessarily approve of another's reforms, and Stalin was not the only one to use consociationalism. It dates from 1603; it was used in Canada in the 19th century, in Austria after WWII, and it is used to-day pretty successfully in Belgium.

It was also used in Lebanon before the civil war, an event triggered more by the invasion of the Israeli army than by any internal weakness, so the Lebanese are now trying again. And lastly, a three-sided version was used in Bosnia in the early 1990s, but despite being in power for eighteen months, those involved never managed to pass a single law.

The verdict seems to be, therefore, that in peaceful societies, a form of consociationalism helps to maintain the peace. In post-conflict zones, however, it is sometimes not strong enough to heal the wounds.

A more Inclusive Methodology

Unfortunately, politicians like majority voting. It means they can control the agenda. In contrast, multi-option voting is a somewhat unpredictable business. But in many instances, that is what it should be. Secondly, for a plural society, it would seem to be fairly essential.

If, therefore, the Assembly were to debate issues in a way which allowed for more than two options to be "on the table" then, at the end of the debate, they could all vote on these options in a multi-option process.

A hybrid form of multi-option voting has been used in the Norwegian parliament since 1804. A different form is used in Sweden and Finland. And certain countries like New Zealand, Finland again and Mexico use multi-option voting in referendums. For some reason, however, the Belfast Talks process did not consider these more consensual methodologies. Nor, for that matter, did the Opsahl Report, despite its Norwegian commissioner.

But yet, if every MLA were to cast his/her preferences on (one, some or) all the options listed in a multi-option debate, it would then be possible to find either that option which best represented the collective consensus or, at the very least, everyone's best compromise.

Furthermore, by examining the level of consensus this particular option received, it would be possible to know, with mathematical certainty, that this option was supported by both or all sides, i.e., that it enjoyed "sufficient consensus", to use the South African term.

And all this decision-making could be done without any resource to sectarian labels.

Beyond D'Hondt: Electing An Inclusive Power-Sharing Executive

The Answer

How can an Assembly of 108 members elect an executive of 10? The answer is PR. If you want the assembly to elect a power-sharing executive of both unionists and nationalists (as well as, perhaps, a few others), let the entire Assembly, all 108 members, vote by a system of PR. The outcome of such a vote is bound to be a mixed executive; perfect.

A d'Hondt Executive

But what do the political parties want? In a word, control-freakery. The four big parties decided that they would control everything, so they devised a process by which they could share out the ten ministerial posts, to the exclusion of the smaller parties' MLAs who are, in effect, disenfranchised.

The process was based on party strengths. Accordingly, the UUP and SDLP were to get three ministers, the DUP and SF two, and the order of "cherry picking" was as follows: UUP, SDLP, DUP, SF, UUP, SDLP, DUP, SF, UUP, SDLP.

This d'Hondt process, named after the Belgian mathematician who devised a formula for awarding seats in a PR-list election, was never meant to be used for a post-election selection, with everything in the hands of just a few party leaders. Secondly, at the time of voting - 1998 - the electorate did not even know who was standing for which ministerial post. Indeed, at that stage, we were not even sure how many ministers there would be!

Thirdly, the Belfast Agreement's interpretation of the d'Hondt process could allow for some bizarre situations. The SDLP, to take as an example the party winning the (second, sixth and) tenth cherry, knew at the beginning of the process exactly who was going to get that last cherry, but not which cherry it was to be. It was almost as if the system was designed to ensure the tenth chosen minister would be unsuited for the post involved. As it happened, of course, Brid Rodgers made an excellent Minister of Agriculture, but that, may I suggest, was our collective good luck and not the natural result of the chosen system of selection.

The First and Deputy First Ministers

The choice of the two First Ministers is another example of control-freakery. Now in many situations, a straight majority vote identifies the opinion of only the author of the resolution and, in the old Stormont, this would have been the opinion of the leader of the Official Unionists.

In the consociational voting of the Belfast Agreement, the authors are now a team, the combined leadership of the UUP and the SDLP. It is a huge improvement on simple majority rule. But logically, mathematically, the actual vote itself identifies not the will of the Assembly, but only the combined will of the two party leaderships.

In democratic theory, the appointment of the First and Deputy First Ministers should involve an election. Under the Belfast Agreement, however, it was turned into a decision. The two leaderships got together, sorted out a pair of candidates for the two jobs concerned, and then presented this as a "yes-or-no" decision to the Assembly.

The Answer, Again

So, as noted above, the Assembly should elect the Executive by PR, and this could be done (by a closed or open PR-list system or) by PR-STV, or by a PR-matrix vote - see below.

One approach is to let the MLAs cast their PR-STV preferences, having first pre-determined the order of importance for these ten ministerial posts; but that could mean that some ministers are unsuited to their portfolios.

A second method is to allow the ten ministers, once elected, to then decide for themselves who is best suited to what post; but, as is obvious to most observers, that could be especially problematic.

The third method is to use the matrix vote.2 This allows each and every MLA to choose not only whom he/she wishes to serve as a minister, but also the ministerial post to which he/she thinks that nominee is most suited. The count is conducted according to a PR formula, and the outcome gives not only the ten most successful candidates but also the ministerial post in which, according to the consensus of the Assembly, each should serve.

The outcome is bound to be proportional. That's one advantage. A second bonus is that it allows the individual MLA to vote for a candidate to be in a specific post because he/she thinks that person is best suited to that post. Thirdly, especially for those MLAs who are members of a small party, the process encourages them to vote across party, across gender, and even across the sectarian divide. One might even suggest that, if the MLAs want to be really inclusive and if the political leaders are actually prepared to trust the democratic process, the MLAs could vote for all twelve members of the executive - i.e., the First Minister, the Deputy First Minister and all ten ministers - in the one PR matrix vote. A lovely, and happily rather unpredictable, democratic process - as it should be. In a word, it is a system ideally suited to the time when religious and ethnic labels are no longer deemed to be important or even relevant. Roll on the day!

Self-Determination And The
Seven Year Itch

Madness

The Belfast Agreement states that, whenever the SOS thinks there is a majority in NI in favour of a constitutional switch, he/she "shall" hold a referendum on whether NI should remain in the UK or join a united Ireland, and that this process may be repeated after an interval of at least seven years.

This is bizarre. If 50% + 1 vote in favour of a united Ireland, then it's tiocaidh ar lá and that's that. If, however, a unionist paramilitary shoots a couple of Taigs just before the poll, it will be 50% - 1 and we'll stay in the UK.

Furthermore, if the nationalists loose the first referendum, just as some French-speaking Quebeçois lost their first ballot, there will be another one. These Quebeçois lost their second poll as well, so a few are now planning a third. And this same NI process, in theory, can go on and on, ad nauseam, until at last there's a united Ireland.

The International Experience

In 1947, the UN suggested Kashmir should have a yes-or-no poll on its constitutional status. In theory, Kashmir could be independent, or part of India, or part of Pakistan, or a UN protectorate, or whatever. But in practice, there is to be a two-option ballot, no compromise, Hindu versus Moslem, India versus Pakistan. No wonder there have been three wars already, and some are lining up for a fourth, potentially nuclear confrontation.

In 1991, the EU set up the Badinter Commission to examine the prospects for Yugoslavia, and it suggested any part wishing to achieve self-determination should first hold a referendum. As a result, there were over twenty referendums, as various regions tried to become independent nations. And to quote Sarajevo's now legendary newspaper, Oslobodjenje, "all the wars in the former Yugoslavia started with a referendum".3

In Indonesia, which has already been dubbed "Asia's Yugoslavia", the 'international community' decided that the (Catholic) East Timorese could be independent of the (Moslem) West Timorese, (just as, in Croatia, it allowed the Catholic Slavs to be independent of the Orthodox Slavs).

To-day, in Indonesia, people are fighting, literally, to have a referendum in Aceh, Ambon and Irian Jaya, to name but three provinces in a country consisting of 3000 inhabited islands. Does every one of them have the right to self-determination?

Sanity

A Peace Process, by definition, should allow for peaceful change by means of an inclusive decision-making process. If this province is to be allowed to move from a UK into a united Ireland, it should be enabled to do so by a gradual process, i.e., via a transition stage involving a form of joint authority or some such. Accordingly, if and when a change is indeed contemplated, there should be a multi-option poll with, therefore, a range of options to choose from.

Secondly, the voting process itself should be more peaceful than it is at the moment. After all, the democratic process (they say) is an intrinsic part of the Peace Process. Instead, therefore, of the adversarial win-or-lose majority vote where the voter votes for what he/she wants in the hope that he and his will outnumber the rest, we need a more consensual win-win methodology.

Let the voter vote for what he wants, of course; but let him/her also state his compromise position. And if every voter states their individual compromise position, it will be perfectly easy to calculate the collective compromise. It is that option with the highest average preference. The system, known as the modified Borda count or the Borda preferendum, was first advocated in the year 1435.

A Tale Of Three Peace Processes

Bosnia and Lord Paddy

In Bosnia, if Paddy Ashdown decides that a politician is not doing his/her job properly, he sacks them. And that's that. He/she might be the elected representative, democratically chosen in a free and fair election supervised by the OSCE. So what? Paddy is the High Representative and if, in his judgement, the individual concerned is not complying with the Dayton Agreement, then that's it. Do vidjenje. Bye bye.

The people of Bosnia did not approve the Dayton Agreement in a referendum; it was imposed, signed by a few outsiders, one of whom is now an indicted war criminal, Serbia's Slobodan Miloševic. Another, Croatia's Franjo Tudjman, had the good sense to die before he was indicted. But the people of Bosnia had no say whatsoever.

Northern Ireland

In our own process, the people did have a referendum, and the people (they say) are sovereign. We said we wanted the Belfast Agreement. But some politicians have decided that they are actually more sovereign than the people, and they have worked to bring down the Agreement. Why is it that the SOS never has the courage to just dismiss those who are being obstructive? And why, in 1998 at the time of the referendum, was it not said that either it is the Belfast Agreement or it is Joint Authority? They said there was no 'Plan B'. But alas, they thus implied that it was a choice of either the Agreement or Direct Rule, so to encourage some to be anti-Agreement.

So let us ask the more general question: why is it that the Belfast Agreement has collapsed? Is it because of some more serious fault lines? Take, for example, the simple fact that David Trimble, to survive politically as an MP, needs first and foremost the support of his fellow unionists in Upper Bann.

Secondly, to carry on as leader, he needs the support of the moderates within the UUP. What he does not need, however, are those nationalists and republicans who probably have no thought of ever giving him more than a third or fourth preference.

Inter alia, therefore, we have a political structure in which most politicians have no obvious loyalty to the entire community, but rather, a loyalty to a particular (and often sectarian) sector of the community. Admittedly, Trimble realises that he can aspire to a position of power only by supporting the Agreement. In politics, however, first things first: survival. And if that incentive suggests he should woo his own sup-porters at the expense of the rest of the community, then so be it. Hence these occasional outbursts about the sectarian Republic and whathaveyou. And he, it must be said, is by no means the only example; they exist on both sides.

In NI, then, certain politicians are beholden to their sectarian power-base and are anti-Agreement. What's more, they can afford to be anti-Agreement, for the SOS and the Agreement itself allow them so to be.

Lebanon

In contrast to the Northern Irish, the Lebanese have devised an electoral system to suit their peace process. It works like this: if you, the aspiring politician, want to stand on let us say a socialist ticket, then of course you may. But let us assume that you happen to be a Shia; that you live in a mixed constituency; and that your particular patch is shared by Shia, Sunni and Maronite in a rough ratio of 30:30:30. If this is the case, you must first find a Sunni socialist and a Maronite socialist, so that the three of you can form a socialist ticket.

Then, when the voter votes, he/she must vote for one Shia, one Sunni and one Maronite. The easiest way to do so is to just vote for one complete ticket, but voters can, if they so wish, delete one person and vote for another candidate, as long as the latter is of the same religious group as the one deleted.

One obvious disadvantage is that the system itself perpetuates sectarian labels and therefore sectarianism, just as do the designations of the decision-making process used in the NI Assembly. The advantage, however, is huge: the elected politician is beholden to all his/her constituents. Therefore, to survive, politically, he must support the entire community and therefore the Peace Process. Brilliant. We have lots to learn.

Needless to say, this methodology does not cater, either for those of mixed parentage, or for those of a different grouping such as the Moravians.

For a full description of the matrix vote, see The Politics of Consensus by P J Emerson.

Op cit., 7.2.1999.

Abbreviations

• DUP Democratic Unionist Party
• EU European Union
• MLA Member of the Local Assembly
• MP Member of Parliament NI Northern Ireland
• OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
• PR Proportional Representation
• SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party
• SF Sinn Fein
• SOS Secretary of State
• STV Single Transferable Vote
• UK United Kingdom
• UN United Nations
• UUP Ulster Unionist Party

Published by the New Ireland Group, December, 2003.

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