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Peter Emerson,
The de Borda Institute,
36 Ballysillan Road,
Belfast BT14 7QQ,
Northern Ireland
Tel: +44 (0)28 9071 1795
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Referenda Start Wars

Most international agreements are open to interpretation, and in the wake of the latest census figures, it might be worth our while to analyse the Belfast Agreement in respect of the proposed referendum on Irish unity.

In para (i) of Article 1, the two governments agree “to recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland… whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland.” It goes on to say in para (ii[A1] ) that a united Ireland may be “achieved… subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.”

Which means?
The word “choice” used in para (i) implies the existence of at least two alternatives, so what choice is there? Likewise, as we shall see, the actual meaning of the word “majority” depends upon which of a number of different voting procedures is adopted to measure that majority. Which will lead us later on to the question, how shall the choice be made?

The first phrase to question is “a united Ireland” in which the Agreement uses the indefinite article, “a”. This suggests there would appear to be some doubt as to what sort of a united Ireland the signatories had in mind.

Secondly, what are we to understand by the phrase: “the consent of a majority”? It is not “the consent of the people”, it is just “the consent of a majority”. But how do you measure “the consent of a majority”? Well, by asking the people, not just a majority, to vote. And if the people vote 51% for and 49% against, there is no consent, there is obvious dissent. But you could still argue that this is “the consent of a majority”.
Option

Thirdly, we must consider again this word “majority” for there are several established ways of measuring “a majority”.

One is to take a simple vote between just two options, regardless of whatever opinions the voters might have on any of the other possible options.

Another method is to use two-round voting, as in the 1992 New Zealand referendum: in the first round, the people vote on lots of options such as A, B, C, D etc. by casting an ‘x’ for just one option; and if no option gains 50% +, the people vote in a second round ballot on the two leading options from the first poll, and whichever option then gains a majority is the winner.

Yet another method is the single transferable vote, stv which is familiar in its pr format in elections. In an stv referendum, there are no surpluses: we just eliminate the least popular option and transfer its votes according to its second preferences, and the process continues until one option gains the 50% + 1 quota.

A fourth method, Condorcet, is like a sports league. Everybody votes 1, 2, 3… as in stv, but the count compares the popularity of each option with all the others in turn.

Finally, there is the points system of voting, the Borda count, in which (with, say, the same four options) a first choice gains 4 points, the next 3 points and so on. Although this is a non-majoritarian methodology (because the outcome depends upon every vote, not just upon those of a majority), it could still be argued that the option which gains the most points also enjoys majority support of those voting.
A B C

By way of example, consider a three-option ballot in which 35% have preferences A BC, 32% B C A and 33% C B A (1st, 2nd and 3rd preferences respectively). In this scenario, a first-past-the-post ‘majority’ (or plurality) vote on all three options would give an outcome of A; (A gets 35, C comes second with 33 and B third with 32); a simple majority vote between A and B would give the outcome B (by 65 to 35), a simple majority between B and C would also give the outcome B (67 to 33), while a vote between A and C would give C. A two-round vote would again give a majority in favour of B. An stv count, however, would give a majority in favour of C, but both Borda and Condorcet counts would return to an outcome of B. In other words, the “majority option” often depends on the count, and in this example, depending on which methodology is used, the outcome could be anything at all, either A or B or C!

In many instances, then, a simple majority vote between only two options does not give a definitive answer, whereas a multi-option approach has at least the potential so to do.

In Northern Ireland, to-day, there might be a majority in favour of staying in the UK; but there could also be a majority in favour of a nicely worded joint authority; and there might even be a majority in favour of a very autonomous two-part federal Ireland. It all begs the question, which majority is the most democratic? This leads to another more serious question: in practice, is the two-option majority vote anything more than a means by which those who set the question contrive to dominate the agenda?
People

If we choose to interpret the wording of the crucial paragraphs (i) and (ii) to mean that the people should decide, (and not just the politicians), then it could be interpreted as suggesting that there should be a multi-option vote. It does not mention the methodology to be used.

In the referendum poll, however, it would seem that certain options like “joint authority” are ruled out, because of the use of a possibly exclusive “or” separating “Union with Great Britain” and “a sovereign united Ireland”. Collectively, perhaps, we are not allowed a compromise, it all depends on this first ‘or’. Individually, however, we are allowed a compromise –and here we come to a second ‘or’ - because in para (vi) each of us can be recognised “as Irish or British, or both”. Here an inclusive “or” has been used. So, if the first ‘or’ is also inclusive, maybe further constitutional options such as joint authority are allowed? We just cannot be sure.

Indeed, we cannot be sure of anything save that, to quote Oslobodjenje, Sarajevo’s now legendary newspaper, “all the wars in the former Yugoslavia started with a referendum”, (7.2.1999).
Secretary

Now para 2 of Schedule 1 of the Agreement states that the Secretary of State “shall [direct the holding of a poll] if at any time it appears to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.” So it doesn’t depend upon the political situation at the time, or even upon the Secretary of State’s whim.

Furthermore, if the vote says “no”, there shall be another poll, and another poll, every seven years or so, until there is a “yes”. This is not a referendum but a “never-end-um”, and it is similar to the situation in Quebec where, so far, there have been two votes on independence, and both have said “no”. Despite the violence these polls have provoked, some Quebeçois are now planning a third referendum.

With lessons both Balkan and Canadian unlearnt, we return to Northern Ireland where, if demographic trends continue, there will probably be, sooner or later, a “yes” vote: 50% + 1 and then it’s Tiocfaidh ar la. But will it bring peace?

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Online Consensus

OurKingdom, the new economics foundation and the de Borda Institute recently gave interested parties from think tanks, research groups and campaigning organisations, and members of the general public, the opportunity to participate in an online trial of consensus decision making.

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The de Borda Institute and nef (the new economics foundation) have received a grant from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust to test the potential of consensus voting More...

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