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A Post mortem on Iraq
March 2005

(The November 2002, UN) 'Resolution 1441 on Iraq was passed unanimously!' This statement was used repeatedly by Messrs. Bush and Blair. Indeed, it almost became their mantra. But what did that vote actually mean?

France, for example, did not like the expression 'serious consequences'. So when France voted in favour, did she support the motion with enthusiasm, or did she think voting 'yes' was just marginally better than voting 'no'? Furthermore, was she thinking in terms solely of the resolution, or was she taking other considerations into account, the need for international solidarity or some such?

A Question Of Choice
Why, then, was only one resolution on the table? In other words, why was it that only the US/UK team proposed a resolution? Secondly, why is it that a vote is held only when the sponsors already know that the outcome is going to be favourable? In a word, is the whole thing just a fix?

Well, in most instances of majority voting in the UN Security Council (as well as in most national referendums and in most parliamentary votes), the answer is the question… plus or minus the odd amendment perhaps. Those who draft the motion thus dominate the debate. Admittedly, in the UN, there is a lot of diplomacy which precedes the vote, (not to mention some other goings-on which pass for diplomacy), and everything is done in order to ensure that at least nine of the fifteen members vote in favour. In this respect, Bush and Blair did not get exactly what they wanted. Nevertheless, because it was they and only they who were drafting the resolution, they managed, literally, to get most of their ideas adopted.

This description of the decision-making process is confirmed by the fact that, when it seemed that they would not get what they wanted, they did not even have a vote. As in the second resolution, March 2003.

Majoritarianism
Despite the fact that there are many voting procedures by which decisions can be made,1 most politicians have adopted, or simply inherited, the closed question of the majority vote. And whenever the simple majority vote has proved inadequate, they have devised a weighted, qualified, twin or consociational variation.2 The majoritarian theme, however, remains constant. Politicians, it seems, are obsessed with binary decision-making.

In conflict resolution work, in contrast, mediators invariably rely on open questions. Whether the problem is domestic between partners, or ethno-religious between two or more groups, counsellors invariably start by trying to find out what options are possible. Next, with amendments and additional clauses where necessary, they establish what are everybody's preferences. And finally, they identify the best possible compromise, i.e., that option which is everybody's highest average preference. It is, to quote the jargon, an open, win-win procedure.

In politics, however, it's invariably win-or-lose; we use closed questions. Everything, seemingly, is dichotomous. Every political question is either 'Option A, yes or no?' or 'Option A versus option B?' Hence, in so many conflicts, the questions are fixed: 'Are you Protestant or Catholic? Serb or Croat? Hutu or Tutsi? Left-wing or right-wing? Communist or Capitalist? Resolution 1441, for or against? With me or against me?'3 And because the voting procedure which concludes the debate is so adversarial, the debate itself is also, in many instances, acrimonious.

We ourselves determine what then determines us.

Majority voting has one obvious characteristic. It allows those in power to control events. Political leaders write the motion. They also decide when to hold the vote. And in most circumstances, they win. Little wonder, then, that the majority vote in its referendum form was the chosen instrument of such notables as Napoleon, Mussolini, Hitler, Duvalier, Khomeini, Miloševic and Tudjman, to name but some of those who have used this methodology successfully, and only two 'democratic dictators', Pinochet and Mugabe, actually lost a plebiscite.4 Little wonder, too, that majority voting is used by so many political leaders in their parliaments, where many of them have the added advantage of the party whip!5

Very few questions in politics, however, are actually dichotomous.6 If, then, the question is indeed either/or, it has probably been framed in the wrong way. Nothing, in politics, is 'black-or-white'; there are always the various shades of grey. Indeed, on most topics, the possibilities are legion: there are numerous constitutional arrangements to choose from, umpteen planning configurations, countless budgetary allocations, tax levels, etc., etc..7 It was not a question of 'Resolution 1441, yes or no?' It was, or rather it should have been, 'How shall we deal with the problem of Iraq?'

In most instances, therefore, if a politician argues that the question is definitely either/or, it is because he or she is trying at least to manipulate the agenda, at most to control the outcome. Ah, you might say, 'he or she'; is that not a dichotomous choice? True or false might be, and so too right or wrong. Democracy, however, is for both male and female, for both Hutu and Tutsi, for all Druze, Maronite, Shia and Sunni. Humanity needs diversity. (Pro)creativity requires both sexes. Democracy, by definition, involves everybody. And it really is time we replaced our win-or-lose majoritarian processes by a win-win procedure, a means by which (almost) all can come to their best collective compromise. We should start with Dáil Éireann and maybe too the NI Assembly.

The democratic process should be not divisive but cohesive. Politics should consist, not of closed two-option questions, but of open, multi-option ballots. And political disputes should not be exacerbated by the use of exclusive votes, but resolved with the help of inclusive voting procedures. In a word, politics should be peaceful.

A Plural Democracy
So what might be a better methodology? Well, to return to the UN, if each country or group of countries had been able to draft their own complete resolutions, even if these various wordings shared much in common, there could then have been a debate on the various merits of each draft. The US/UK might have proposed, let us say, option A; France, Germany and Russia, option B; Syria and Cameroun, perhaps, option C; and maybe Ireland, for she too was a member in 2003, option D, either individually or in partnership. In all probability, there would have been about five drafts on the table. Let us first examine the theory.

During the course of such a debate, points can be raised, queries asked, nuances discussed, clarifications sought, and proposals modified. Sometimes, perhaps, a new idea may emerge, in which case another proposal may be added (although, of course, any one mover may propose only one draft). Sometimes, what's more, a participant may succeed in persuading others of the merits of their case. So, as the debate progresses, the number of proposals on the table (and summarised on a computer screen) may rise and fall.

Eventually, the discussions will come to a natural conclusion. If the debate boils down to just one draft resolution, this can be said to represent the verbal consensus. If, however, a degree of discord persists, and if therefore there are still quite a few options to choose from, the fifteen countries can move to a vote, so to express their preferences on these (five) options, in order to then identify their votal consensus.

One of the options is bound to be seen as more popular than the other four… for in such circumstances, the chances of all five options getting exactly the same mean score are just about zilch. 'The Borda count always gives a definite result.'8

The logic is as follows. If option D gets an average preference score of 5, this would mean that all the member states gave this option their bottom preference. If option E gets an average score of 3, then either everyone gave this option their 3rd preference, or some gave it their 2nd and an equal number gave it their 4th, or whatever. And if another option gets an average score of 1, then everyone gave this option their 1st preference.

So if, in practice, option A had actually come out with an average preference score of, say, 1.5 or even higher, it would be obvious to all that the member states had been persuaded by the debate to give this option a very high preference. And then Messrs. Bush and Blair could have stated that this resolution had the overwhelming support of the Security Council.

If the outcome of a preference vote were an option with an average preference score of about 2, this could be said to represent the UN Security Council's votal consensus. Or if the winning outcome had achieved an average preference score of only 2.5 or less, then obviously the other options would also be close to the mean score of 3, either just above or just below. In this case, the winning option would represent the best possible compromise in what was nevertheless a fairly controversial debate.

Council may wish to decide that no option should ever be adopted unless it receives a certain minimum average preference score.9 If, let us say, the most popular option has a score of only 2.9, it would be prudent to resume the debate.

Democratic Decision-Making
As noted earlier, the outcome of a majority vote is usually predictable and rather meaningless. In a rankings system of voting, in contrast, the outcome is much more unpredictable and it does mean something! Furthermore, in this computer age, there is no excuse for the continued use of the simple majority vote; it is both the most inaccurate measure of collective opinion ever invented - it was first used in Greece some 2,500 years ago - and it is the most primitive means of conflict resolution ever devised, apart that is from that other dual-option procedure, the duel.

If democracy is for everybody (and not just a majority), if democracy is for plural multi-party societies, then those involved in decision-making should resist the temptation of assuming that everything is a question of two mutually exclusive opposites (and not least because, in most instances, this assumption is false). Instead, they should allow for an open, multi-option debate. This can best be done if the vote which concludes the debate is also open, multi-optional and consensual. Indeed, the adoption of a democratic structure which is also a means of conflict resolution may actually help to prevent outbreaks of violence. Again, we ourselves determine what then determines us. The rankings system or modified Borda count is the obvious choice.

There is nothing new in this proposal. The Borda count was first proposed by Nicholas Cusanus in the year 1435 and advocated by Jean-Charles de Borda in the 1780s.10 The modified Borda count11 (or Borda preferendum, as it was called), was promoted by the Green Party in relation to its Northern Ireland policy, in 1982, and has often been mentioned in the Dáil. As far as is known, it was first mooted to the British parliament only in 2003.12

The need for such a procedure in most parliaments is obvious enough. In plural societies like Northern Ireland and Bosnia, the requirement is of course greater.13 But in international gatherings like the UN, where there is an over-riding necessity to ensure that decision-making is not the preserve of any one faction (i.e., the most powerful), the introduction of multi-option preference voting must surely be a priority! Therefore, it should also be a priority here at home.

Notes

1 If there are more than two options, the count can be conducted according to the rules of the alternative or single transferable vote (AV or STV), approval voting, a Borda count, Condorcet, plurality voting, serial voting and two-round voting. The last two methodologies are catered for in the Finnish, Swedish and/or Norwegian parliaments, but most elected chambers use a form of two-option, i.e., majority voting.

2 The consociational vote is a huge improvement on the simple majority vote, especially in plural societies. In Northern Ireland, for example, the Belfast Agreement stipulates that 'unionist' and 'nationalist' must both work together to propose the motion, and vote together to legislate. Unfortunately, however, the methodology perpetuates sectarianism, for it requires those concerned to identify themselves according to certain 'designations'. Furthermore, it is still adversarial, for it still implies that there are only two possible outcomes.

3 The first three questions were and/or still are used by those who seek to promote sectarian conflict. The fourth question was the basis of the Cold War. And the final question - 'Are you with me or against me?' - was famously asked by George W Bush, shortly after the Sept 2001 attack on the Twin Towers, in order to promote his 'war on terror'. Interestingly enough, it was also used János Kádár of the Hungarian Communist Party. And it first appeared in the Bible: St. Luke Ch. 9 v. 50 and Ch. 11 v. 23.

4 For a full list of 'democratic dictators', see the author's Defining Democracy, Belfast, The de Borda Institute, 2002, pp 104-110.

5 The story in Ireland is very similar, both in votes in parliament and in referendums. Rarely does the government admit that a subject is actually multi-optional, but even when they do - as in the Green Paper on abortion, when they spoke of seven possibilities - they still resort to a majority vote.

6 The only country in the world ever to offer its citizens a referendum on the question - 'Which side of the road shall we drive on, left or right?' - actually presented a three-option ballot. Sweden, 1955. Ibid, p 11.

7 New Zealand, for example, offered its electorate a choice of five electoral systems. That was in 1992, but ten years earlier, Guam had gone one better and offered its people a choice of six options in its referendum on the constitution, and just in case that wasn't enough and someone(s) else had another idea, there was a seventh option left blank.

8 Ben Reilly, Social Choice in the South Seas: Electoral Innovation and the Borda Count in the Pacific Island Countries, International Political Science Review, Vol 23, No 4, Oct 2002, p 358.

9 If such a procedure were to be used in the NI Assembly, a certain minimum score would also mean that the proposal in question enjoyed a measure of cross-community support. A further advantage of this methodology, therefore, is that there is no need for any party labels or (sectarian) 'designations'.

10 Iain McLean and Arnold B Urken , Classics of Social Choice, Michigan, University of Michigan, 1995, pp 257-60.

11 In some instances, and in some parliaments, there may be those who cast only some of their preferences. Such is their prerogative but, if so be it, the modified Borda count should be used. This states that those who cast their preferences for all n options shall effect

n, n-1 … 2, 1 points

while those who vote for only m options shall effect

m, m-1 … 2, 1 points.

Thus she who votes for only 1 option gives her favourite option only 1 point; while he who votes for 2 options gives his favourite 2 points and his second choice 1 point; whereas she who casts preferences for all n options gives her favourite option n points, her second choice n-1 points, and so on. No matter what, every voter who participates either fully or partially always gives his favourite option 1 more point than he gives his next preference, and his stated nth preference 1 more point than his (n-1)th preference, whether or not he has expressed that next (n-1)th preference.

12 Lord Meghnad Desai, House of Lords Reform, Hansard, 22.1.2003, pp 742-3. Given the voting profile of those concerned, it was a decision-making methodology by which a decision could not be made: the House of Commons took five majority votes, and lost them all!

13 Sadly, both the Belfast Agreement and the Dayton Accord (General Framework Agreement) continue to take a dichotomous approach to decision-making.

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