Bosnia
and Herzegovina after Paddy Ashdown
(Konjic 2005)
Outline
The purpose of the seminar was to show how a group of people
can come to a collective democratic decision, i.e., one which
caters for (almost) everyone. It involved a three-stage process:
i) workshops, to produce options;
ii) a plenary, to discuss and collate those options:
iii) a multi-option preference vote (a modified Borda count);
and
iv) an analysis.
Introduction
A brief introduction on the deficiencies of majority voting
pointed out that, in many instances, a for-or-against vote
identifies, not the will of those voting, not even the will
of the majority of those voting, but only the will of the
author of the relevant proposal. In other words, as often
as not, the answer is the question. He who writes the proposal
dominates the agenda.
No wonder majority voting has been the chosen methodology
of the likes of Napoleon, Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler, Duvalier,
Pinochet, Khomeini, Mugabe and, more recently, Saddam Hussein.
Messrs. Bush and Blair used a similar procedure in the UN
Security Council (Resolution 1441), where they and only they
drafted the resolution, albeit with a bit of (what is sometimes
called) diplomacy; but no other country was able (or willing)
to put forward an alternative proposal; multi-option voting
- or pluralism - was not even possible!
There must be, and there is, a better way.
Workshops
The seminar then split into three workshops: one in Bosnian
and two in English, with one of the latter a role-play based
on the current situation: a ratio of hdz, sda, sdp and sds,
to reflect the current balance of the BiH parliament.
The task of all three workshops was to identify a number of
possible answers to the question: "HOW shall the future
of BiH be decided?" Many people have ideas as to WHAT
they might like BiH to be or become - a unified country, the
status quo, a tripartite federation, a country broken up -
but the question was HOW? In other words, by what process,
which must of course be democratic, should change, if any,
be contemplated and then perhaps undertaken.
On completion of their deliberations, the workshops returned
to plenary, and the ideas were displayed via a data projector
onto a computer screen. This required the services of an independent
team of consensors, as they are called, and it was they who
collated all the options and put them into a natural sequence,
with refinements and other suggestions coming from the participants.
At the end of this second part, the chair confirmed with all
concerned that their particular options were included in the
final list, if not verbatim then at least in composite, and
the consensors then produced the multi-option ballot paper.
The Theory
In some debates, what may start as a multi-option affair may
sometimes boil down to a single option, in which case all
concerned may accept that they have come to a verbal consensus.
In other instances, where the debate comes to a natural conclusion
without such a verbal consensus - i.e., with a number of different
options still on the computer screen - the chair may ask all
to proceed to a vote, so to identify the votal consensus.
If, for example, there are five options - options A, B, C,
D and E - on the ballot paper, participants could be asked
to express their preferences on these five. If, then, option
D, say, gets everyone's 1st preference, it will get the best
possible result, an average preference score of 1. If option
C, meanwhile, gets everyone's bottom preference, a 5, then
C will get the worst possible score, an average preference
score of 5. If, at the same time, everyone gives option A
their 3rd preference, or if 50% of those voting give A a 2nd
while the other half give it a 4th, then option A will get
the mean, an average preference score of 3.
Now in real life, the chances of every option getting this
mean score of 3 are just about nil; something is bound to
be above average, and some options will be below. Furthermore,
if the winning option gets a very high score, 1.5 or even
higher, then this can be called an almost unanimous accord;
if the winning option gets a score of about 2, this may be
said to represent the common consensus; while if the highest
score is just 2.5 or perhaps lower (though definitely more
than 3), then this outcome may be called the best possible
compromise. But a modified Borda count (mbc) will always give
a definite result!
The Practice
Our ballot paper consisted of 8 options. Copies were made,
and the participants then proceeded to the vote. A few abstained;
of those who voted, 5 submitted a full vote (casting preferences
for all eight options), while only 2 people voted for one
preference only. The votes were fed into the computer, and
the 'de Borda' computer program, Decision-maker, gave an analysis
of these votes according to eight different methodologies:
i) (majority voting, which is used in almost every parliament
in the world, or) plurality voting (as used in Finland and
elsewhere in referendums); in majority/plurality voting, only
the 1st preferences are taken into account;
ii) two-round voting is a plurality vote followed, if need
be - i.e., if no option gets 50% or more - by a majority vote
between the two top options; (it is used in the Norwegian
parliament as well as in New Zealand referendums)
iii) in alternative voting or the single transferable vote,
voters cast one or more preferences, (it is used, albeit as
an electoral system, in Australia); votes are transferred
as per the voters' declared preferences, until one option
gets 50% + 1 or more of the vote;
iv) approval voting allows the voter to 'approve' of one or
more options (and it is used in the UN, again as an electoral
system);
v) a Borda count, bc, [see below], (has been used in Austria,
but only as part of their electoral system)
vi) a modified Borda count, mbc, caters for partial voting*
vii) serial voting (which is used in the Swedish parliament)
is a series of majority votes, and
viii) a Condorcet count, [see below], (which also caters for
partial voting).
The two most accurate methodologies are the modified Borda
count and the Condorcet count. To take a sporting analogy,
the Condorcet is like a league system: each pair of options
is taken, one at a time, to see which of the pair is more
popular, and the option, overall, with the most wins is the
final winner. An mbc, on the other hand, is a points system,
and we look, as it were, only at the number of goals scored.
Needless to say, the winner of the modified Borda count is
usually the winner of the Condorcet count as well, but there
are exceptions.
The Analysis
The analysis of our own experiment, as shown on screen by
the computer, is as shown.
Voting Procedures
options (Majority)PluralityVoting Two-roundvoting Alter-nativevoting
Approvalvoting Bordacountbc ModifiedBordacount mbc Serial
Voting Condorcet
A 1 11 130 43 11.5
B 2 10 120 41 10.5
C - 9 100 35 2 9.5
D 4 8 8 13 164 54 11 13.0
E - 11 124 33 10.0
F 4 9 91 12 6.0
G 1 8 80 23 7.0
H 5 5 5 8 96 39 8.5
As can be seen from the above, the most popular option, as
measured by both the Modified Borda Count and a Condorcet
count (not to mention Serial Voting, Approval voting, Two-round
voting and the Alternative vote) is option D, an education/awareness
campaign within BiH and the diaspora. In second place, again
according to a bc, an mbc and a Condorcet, is option A, the
series of thematic round-tables.
It is worth pointing out the obvious, namely, that if a count
is conducted according to different criteria, then maybe the
outcomes will differ. In this particular example, the plurality
vote gives the winning option as option H, but despite getting
the highest number of 1st preferences, 5 of them, H is obviously
not the most popular option. So (majority)/plurality voting
gives the wrong answer; no surprises there, of course, for
the 2,500-year-old majority voting is the most primitive and
inaccurate measure of collective opinion ever invented, and
the 2,000-year-old plurality vote is not an awful lot better!
Conclusion
The purpose of the seminar was to show that it is possible,
even on the most contentious of subjects, to identify the
common consensus of those voting. In this instance, it applied
only to those present and voting. Nevertheless, the outcome
indicated there was a fair measure of consensus for option
D, and the next stage of the democratic process would have
been to resume the debate, via a further set of workshops,
in order to put detailed flesh onto the bones of that proposal
- the nature of the campaign, and the decision-making process
it would lead to.
On reflection, it might have been interesting to have conducted
two votes, one with the participants in their role play and,
in a second poll, having identified all the possible options
in the role play, one as a vote with participants expressing
their own preferences.
Post-script
Some, admittedly, were unhappy with the outcome. This is only
to be expected. On such a controversial topic, there is hardly
going to be total unanimity. There again, of the 17 voters,
option D received 4 x 1st preferences, 4 x 2nd preferences,
3 x 3rds, 1 x 4th and 1 x 5th preference, and only 4 persons
gave it no preference at all. So option D was definitely the
most popular option on the day, and maybe it must be assumed
that those complaining were still in their role play, acting
as politicians who are often unwilling to let the people have
their full, democratic say.
As was said once in Belfast City Council, when one of the
candidates learnt that he was just about to lose, "The
people have voted… the bastards!" Sadly, such politicians
continue to advocate the majority vote, even in plural societies
like Bosnia and Northern Ireland.
Peter Emerson
In a bc on a ballot consisting of n options, a 1st preference
gets n points, a 2nd preference gets n-1 points, a 3rd preference
gets n-2 points, and so on, until an nth preference gets 1
point.
In an mbc on a ballot paper of n options, where the voter
casts preferences for only m options, a 1st preference gets
m points, a 2nd preference gets m-1 points, and so on.
Accordingly, in an mbc, if a voter votes for only his 1st
preference, that option gets just 1 point.
If a second voter votes for both her 1st and her 2nd preference,
her 1st preference gets 2 points and her 2nd preference gets
1 point.
If a third voter casts preferences for three options, his
1st preference gets 3 points, his 2nd preference gets 2 points,
and his 3rd preference gets 1 point. And so on.
OurKingdom, the new economics foundation and the de Borda Institute recently gave interested parties from think tanks, research groups and campaigning organisations, and members of the general public, the opportunity to participate in an online trial of consensus decision making.
The de Borda Institute and nef (the new economics foundation) have received a grant from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust to test the potential of consensus voting More...
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