The following was published in the
November 2004 issue of Fortnight magazine.
Electing Or Selecting An Executive?
Most elections involve either the appointment
of just the one person - a potential Prime Minister or Taoiseach,
or, for example, a chairperson or treasurer - or they involve
two or more persons of equal status - MPs/ TDs, MLAs, or committee
members. Like any other cabinet, however, a NI Executive involves
persons of different status: the two First and Deputy First
Ministers, and then the ten other ministers. The question,
then, is this: how can the entire Assembly choose, collectively,
the twelve most popular MLAs to be members of a proportional
power-sharing executive, such that each minister is appointed
to the particular portfolio to which, in the consensus of
the Assembly, he/she is most suited?
The Belfast Agreement
According to present structures, the choice of the First and
Deputy First Ministers is not an election at all but a decision:
the two 'big' parties decide on a pair, and the Assembly is
able only to ratify this 'key' decision, 'yes-or-no', in a
consociational majority vote. The choice of the ten ministers
is not an election either, but another selection, a 'cherry-picking'
procedure in which only the four 'big' parties participate,
sharing the various ministerial posts according to the d'Hondt
formula. Maybe there are better ways.
A PR election
One possibility is to allow all the MLAs, in their order of
preference, to use a PR election to choose those whom they
wish to be in the Executive. Just as the people use PR-STV
to elect the Assembly, the latter could use the same electoral
system to choose the two and the ten; or, better still, it
could use just the one election to elect all twelve. This
methodology would cater for the election of ten or twelve
ministers of equal status, all of them as yet without portfolio.
The question of which minister then filled which post could
either be pre-determined, but this might mean that persons
were appointed to inappropriate posts; or it could remain
for the Executive itself to sort out, which would be at least
problematic.
The Matrix Vote
The wiser course would be to allow all the MLAs, in their
order of preference, to choose not only those whom they wish
to be in the Executive, but also the ministerial post in which
they wish each of their nominees to serve. Unlike a PR-STV
election - a linear vote, in which each MLA expresses their
preferences in, as it were, a line of information - this matrix
vote would involve a tabular format. By way of a simple example,
let us consider the election of a 6-person executive consisting
of a First Minister, a Deputy First Minister, and four other
members, the ministers of departments A, B, C and D. The corresponding
ballot paper would look like this.
PORTFOLIOS Preferences
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
First Minister
Deputy First Minister
Minister of A
Minister of B
Minister of C
Minister of D
Although various parties could come to their
own internal decisions and then apply the party whip, ideally,
the vote would be free. Every MLA would be eligible to vote,
and every MLA would be eligible for ministerial office. Each
would choose his/her six nominees, in order of preference.
Then he/she would decide which of these six is best qualified
for which post. And finally, he/she would vote by inserting
these six names, one name in each column and one in each row.
An example of a completed ballot paper is as shown below.
PORTFOLIOS Preferences
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
First Minister Ms. T
Deputy First Minister Mr. M
Minister of A Ms. P
Minister of B Ms. J
Minister of C Mr. K
Minister of D Mr. Q
The first stage of the count is a standard
PR-STV election, by which are identified the six most popular
MLAs. In the second stage, these six are appointed, in turn,
each to that ministerial post for which they received the
most support. In the unlikely event of a tie, priority is
given to the more popular minister and the more important
portfolio.
Conclusion
The advantages of this methodology are several. As noted above,
it allows all MLAs to participate on an equal basis. Secondly,
it allows them all to enjoy equal eligibility for ministerial
office. Thirdly, it allows them all, if they so wish, to cross
the party, the gender and even the sectarian divide. Fourthly,
it gives each MLA a much larger degree of choice. Fifthly,
it all but ensures that people are appointed to posts for
which they are best suited. Sixthly, whether or not some or
all of the parties use the whip, the outcome is bound to be
proportional. Seventhly, the outcome is probably also bound
to be gender balanced in so far as the Assembly itself is
gender balanced. Lastly, and most importantly, the entire
procedure can be undertaken without any resort to party labels
let alone sectarian designations. It is, therefore, ideally
suited for the Assembly, not only in the present climate,
but also in the future, when other subjects may be considered
more important than the question of national allegiance.
Wider Applications
The matrix vote is also suitable for national governments.
The British parliamentary system gives the Prime Minister
almost dictatorial powers, as seen recently in Tony Blair's
re-appointment of Alan Milburn. At least, in the Republic,
the PR electoral system allows for a more plural parliament,
and the powers of the Taoiseach are constrained a little by
the needs of the FF-PD coalition. The unionists would have
less to fear, however, if the Republic were governed not by
a majority but by an all-party coalition, something which
the Swiss have used, successfully, since 1959.
In both Dáil Éireann and the
House of Commons, therefore, the more democratic form of government
would be an all-party coalition, and the more democratic way
of choosing it would be a matrix vote.
Further Refinements
PR-STV can be a little capricious, especially when used by
small electorates. This is due to the fact that, in the count,
only some of the voters' 2nd and subsequent preferences are
taken into consideration. It might be better, therefore, to
use the quota Borda system as the basis of the PR election,
for this considers all the preferences cast by all.
An Historical Perspective
Proposed in 1979, the matrix vote was first put to the test
in the New Ireland Group's 1986 'People's Convention', a public
meeting of over 200 persons, with participants from both Sinn
Féin and the Official (Ulster) Unionist Party, as well
as everything else in between of course, and even some from
Ulster Clubs! The exercise was a success: an all-party power-sharing
'executive' was elected. Subsequently, the methodology was
described in the author's Consensus Voting Systems, 1991,
and there's more of all that on www.deborda.org
To-day, this methodology is used by the NI
Green Party for the election of its own executive, and has
recently been adopted as party policy by Comhaontas Glas/Green
Party in the Republic.
OurKingdom, the new economics foundation and the de Borda Institute recently gave interested parties from think tanks, research groups and campaigning organisations, and members of the general public, the opportunity to participate in an online trial of consensus decision making.
The de Borda Institute and nef (the new economics foundation) have received a grant from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust to test the potential of consensus voting More...
Site information now available in a number
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